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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to analyse the impact of port demand variability on the allocative efficiency 
of Spanish port authorities during the period 1986-2007. From a distance function model we 
can obtain a measure of allocative efficiency using two different approaches: error 
components approach and parametric approach. We model the variability of port demand 
from the cyclical component of traffic series by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The 
results show that the inclusion of variability does not affect the efficiency measures, except in 
the case of containerised general cargo. Moreover, we demonstrate that port authorities have 
excess capacity and their resources are misallocated. Finally we establish that the allocative 
inefficiency of Spanish port authorities is difficult to resolve given the limited substitution 
possibilities among the different pairs of inputs.  
Keywords: allocative efficiency, distance function, demand variability, Hodrick-Prescott 
filter, ports. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Spanish port system includes 46 ports of general interest managed by 28 Port Authorities. 
These ports are considered an essential instrument in the Spanish economic mechanism since 
60% of exports and 85% of imports pass through them, representing 53% of Spanish foreign 
trade with the European Union and 96% with third countries.  
In recent decades, traffic supplied by the Spanish ports has been the subject of a considerable 
uptrend. Freight traffic has grown at a rate of 3.7%, mainly due to the evolution of 
containerised general cargo traffic growth rate, which was 10% during the period 1986-2007. 
This traffic growth has been accompanied by changes that have transformed the environment 
in which ports operate. In this way, the traditional management model of the ports, 
characterised by the active presence of a central public agent comprehensively planning the 
whole infrastructure, port facilities and services, is considered inadequate to meet the needs of 
its users. Then, a process of devolution comes up, in which central governments transfer the 
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management of port facilities and services either to regional or municipal public agencies, or 
nongovernmental organisations, user groups or private companies. Within this competitive 
environment framework, port authorities need to improve their efficiency in order to achieve 
gains in port competitiveness. 
In this paper we focus on the impact of port demand variability on allocative efficiency of 
Spanish port authorities. From the estimation of a system of equations formed by an input 
distance function and the associated input cost shares it is possible to obtain two different 
measures of allocative efficiency using two different approaches: the error component 
approach and the parametric approach. On the one hand, the error components approach 
allows us to obtain absolute measures of systematic allocative efficiency for each input and 
authority; on the other hand, from the parametric approach we can achieve relative indices of 
allocative efficiency for each observation, allowing the study of the temporal evolution of the 
inefficiency. This methodology has been applied previously by Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. 
(2004), Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. (2007) and Baños et al. (2002), but it has not been applied 
specifically for port authorities. Demand variability as an explanatory variable in the 
production process has already been included in the papers of Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. (2011) 
and Tovar and Wall (2010), which use the error of a first order autoregressive process to 
approach it. However, our paper is the first one modelling port demand variability from the 
cyclical component of traffic series by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1997). This methodology has the following advantages: it is a linear filter and easy 
to apply, it is well defined for all time series and it allows us to adjust the trend to the series 
by changing the smoothness parameter. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the nature and regulation of the Spanish port 
system and how the demand variability affects the provision of port infrastructure are briefly 
analysed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the econometric specification of the system of 
equations, the methodology used to estimate the allocative efficiency and technical change. 
Section 4 presents the data used. Section 5 shows the results of the estimation. Finally, 
Section 6 offers some conclusions and implications. 
2. DEMAND VARIABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION 
2.1 Nature and regulation of the Spanish port system. 
The adoption of the main Spanish port reform (Act 27/1992) led ports to be managed by a 
landlord model, where the port authority just provides the port infrastructure and regulates the 
use of port space. Port services are essentially provided by private sector operators under an 
authorisation or concession regime. Moreover, from 1992 the Spanish port system is based on 
a self-financing policy for port authorities, and it does not receive any direct subsidy from the 
national government. In this way, current and investment expenditures are covered by current 
incomes, special European Union subsidies and, occasionally, by external debt.  
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These ports authorities have to face uncertainty since the number of vessels arriving at a port 
in a given period of time is subject to some variability, i.e., a certain proportion of demand is 
unpredictable. Port authorities prefer not to reject these vessels because of the lack of 
capacity; this is due to concern about their incomes and the negative effects on their 
reputation and reliability. Therefore, there is an inclination to maintain excess capacity on 
infrastructure to serve all ships which arrive at the port. These choices have an impact on 
costs of ports given that firms facing stochastic demand wishing to provide a universal service 
cannot be technically efficient (Gaynor and Anderson, 1995). Therefore, ports facing some 
uncertainty must have infrastructure, personnel and other services to attend to a larger number 
of ships that they serve on average over the course of a year. 
Besides, port infrastructures have an indivisible nature, so port authorities cannot adapt them 
immediately to changes in demand, and therefore need to have minimum dimensions and 
infrastructures to enable them to supply potential demand. The problem arises in those periods 
when there are unexpected increases in demand. If ports do not have an excess capacity to 
enable them to face these increases, ships may suffer delays and congestion problems which 
in turn may lead to their clients replacing the port with a less congested one, and therefore, as 
mentioned above, their incomes would be reduced and their image with their current and 
potential clients would be deteriorated. This fact encourages overcapacity in ports. 
Finally, demand variability plays an important role in investment decisions in port 
infrastructure. The regulation of the European Union governing Structural Funds, Cohesion 
Fund and Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession expressly requires an ex-ante 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of investment projects whose budget exceeds 50 million Euros, 
10 million and 5 million Euros, respectively. The ex-ante CBA needs to be able to predict 
future flows of costs and benefits which directly dependent on forecasted demand. It is at this 
stage that uncertainty hinders these predictions. The usual way of dealing with uncertainty is 
to present alternative estimates under different scenarios for the explanatory variables of 
demand, i.e. using sensitivity analysis. However, there are few examples of ex-post CBA 
which try to evaluate the net economic return of an infrastructure with actual demand. In the 
next sections we present a methodology to evaluate the impact on variability of demand on 
technical efficiency. 
2.2 Modelling of demand variability 
Following Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. (2011) and Tovar and Wall (2010) we include estimations 
of demand uncertainty as explanatory variables to assess the effect of demand variability on 
both the production process and allocative efficiency. The main differences of our paper are 
the following: firstly we study the provision of infrastructures by port authorities while the 
authors mentioned above analyse cargo handled services performed by private terminals 
which operate in ports. Secondly, they estimate a system of equations formed by a cost 
function and the corresponding share equations, whereas we have chosen an input-oriented 
distance function instead of a cost one. There are other differences in data periodicity, while 
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they use monthly data, we work with annual data. Finally, in our paper, demand variability is 
modelled by the cyclical component of each type of traffic considered, so we obtain an 
approximation of the demand variability for each kind of traffic, while they model uncertainty 
by the error component of a process AR(1), regressing demand from period t-1 on demand 
from period t. It is possible to extract the cyclical component using the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
(1997).  
Under the assumption that all time series yt are the sum of two components: on one hand a 
trend or permanent component gt and on the other hand a cyclical component ct as equation 
(1) shows, which are uncorrelated with each other and taking into account the prior 
knowledge that growth component varies "smoothly" over time, the Hodrick and Prescott 
method allows extraction of the trend series 
ttt cgy             t=1,2,…, T                                                                                                  (1) 
The estimation of the secular component is obtained by minimising the expression (2): 
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where the parameter λ is a positive number that depends on the frequency of the data and 
penalises volatility in the growth component of the series, when λ is high, the penalty will be 
greater and therefore the trend will be smoother, while if λ is closer to zero, the trend will 
have a greater resemblance to the original series. When λ tends to infinity, the solution is the 
same as would be provided by least squares. 
Hodrick and Prescott recommend a value of λ = 1600 for quarterly data. The default value of 
λ in some econometric programs is equal to 100 times the square of the data frequency . Of 
course for the quarterly data it provides the same result as that obtained by these authors. 
Therefore, for annual data, as in our case, we can consider λ = 100. 
The choice of smoothness parameter is carried out from a sensitivity analysis taking values 
similar to other studies in which the Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied on annual series. These 
papers are presented by Dolado et al. (1993) and Backus and Hehoe (1992). We have made 
three estimations for different values of λ: λ=100, λ=300, λ=800, we have not found 
significant differences among them and we can check the robustness of the model, not being 
particularly sensitive to changes in λ. Finally, we have chosen λ=100. 
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
Following Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. (2004) we use two different approaches to calculate a 
measure of allocative efficiency (Atkinson and Cornwell, 1994). The first approach is called 
error components approach and allows us to obtain absolute rates of systematic allocative 
inefficiency for each authority and input. On the other hand, the parametric approach provides 
relative indices of allocative inefficiency for each observation. 
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The calculation of these indices from any of the two methods above mentioned requires, in 
our case, the estimation of a system of equations formed by an input-oriented distance 
function and its associated share equations. 
The choice of an input oriented distance function, instead of an output oriented distance 
function, can be justified by the conditions under which port authorities develop their 
activities, i.e., the authorities do not have control over the volume of traffic which will use 
their facilities, but they can decide about the inputs that they will use. Therefore, our system 
of equations is configured as follows: 
  hhthththt uvTSyxD  ,,,ln1ln                                                                                          (3) 
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where D(xht,yht,Sht,T) is the short run input distance function, x is an input vector, y is an 
output vector, S is a quasi-fixed input, and T is the time trend. The subscript h relates to the h-
th port authority and t relates to the time period. The error components vht and viht represent 
statistical noise, being random disturbance terms distributed with zero mean. The error 
component uh represents the specific individual effects associated with each authority, which 
includes technical efficiency as unobservable and time-invariant differences among 
authorities, but does not contain the cost of allocative efficiency. Finally, the term Aiht 
represents allocative inefficiencies, represented by the difference between actual and 
stochastic input cost shares, with uh and Aiht being inherently independent. 
For the estimation of the input distance function, a flexible functional form has been chosen: a 
multiproduct translog input distance function. Once the translog functional form has been 
applied, the system of equations (3)-(4), becomes the following: 
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where y = (y1,…,ym) is the output vector , x=(x1,…,xn) is the input vector, S is the quasi-fixed 
input , CC=(CC1,…CCm) is the cyclical components vector defined in section 2.2 and T is a 
time trend representing non-neutral technical change. The subscript h=1,…,H relates to the h-
th authority, t relates to the time period and finally, vht and viht represent the statistical noise, 
uh and Aiht represent individual effects (technical inefficiency) and allocative inefficiency, 
respectively.  
Homogeneity of degree one of the input distance function in variable inputs is enforced by 
imposing the restrictions: 
  
We also impose the symmetry conditions: 
Given that the variables are divided by their geometric means, the first-order coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities at the sample mean 
3.1 Error components approach 
Allocative efficiency is modelled from of the input cost share equations. The components Aiht 
are interpreted as a measure of allocative inefficiency which could be systematic given the 
characteristics of the Spanish port infrastructures. If this inefficient behaviour really occurs, 
the mean of this component for each authority and input (aih) should be different from zero. 
Then, equation (4) is transformed as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                (7) 
where the transformed error terms have zero means. 
The coefficients aih can be interpreted as follows: if aih is positive, the input i is being over-
utilised with respect to the other inputs, if aih is equal to zero, the input i is being utilised in 
the optimal proportion, and finally, if aih is negative, the input i is being infra-utilised. 
3.2 Parametric approach 
Economic theory shows that a firm minimises its costs when the marginal rate of technical 
substitution of a pair of inputs equals the ratio of their prices. However, in this methodology it 
is not necessary to assume that firms minimise their real costs. This is interesting because port 
authorities operate under special conditions which do not necessarily require them to 
minimise their costs; on one hand, they operate without competition so they have less 
incentives to be efficient and on the other hand, they may have others objectives apart from 
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cost minimisation, such as regional development, welfare maximisation… so this approach 
allows us not to assume that port authorities minimise their costs. Then, it is valid whether 
they minimise their shadow costs or not, which implies that the marginal rate of technical 
substitution is equal to the ratio of the shadow prices of the inputs (
s
iw ) 
                                                                                                                               (8) 
Therefore, a firm is efficient, i.e., it minimises its costs, when the shadow price ratios coincide 
with market price ratios. However, if there is allocative inefficiency, the two price ratios 
differ. 
Färe and Grosskopf (1990) obtain shadow prices from input distance function using the dual 
Shepard’s lemma: 
                                                                                                                                    (9) 
where ws is the shadow prices vector. 
To study the magnitude and direction of such deviations, a relationship between shadow price 
ratios and actual price ratios is introduced by means of parametric price corrections: 
                                                                                                                                       (10) 
 
From the parameters estimated in (3)-(4), we obtain indices of allocative inefficiency for each 
observation according to the expression: 
                                   
                                                                                                                                 (11) 
 
If kij=1, there is allocative efficiency; if kij >1, input i is under-utilised relative to input j; if kij 
<1, input i is over-utilised relative to input j. 
3.3 Technical change 
Supposing that the trend variable collects the technical change, we can obtain it from the 
distance function as follow: 
                                                                                                                                             (12) 
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In equation (12) we can identify four components of technical change (Baltagi and Griffin, 
1988; Bhattacharyya and Mitra, 1997): 
Pure technological change (PTC),  
Non-neutral technological change (NTC),  
Scale-augmenting technological change (STC),  
Quasi-fixed factor augmenting technological change 
The first component represents the neutral technological change, which does not affect the use 
of factor and the degree of scale economies. The second term includes the effect of 
technological change on the inputs participations, so a positive sign of Ti implies that 
technological change is intensive in the use of input i, while a negative value means that 
technological progress is saved on input i. The third component is the impact of technological 
change on the economies of scale, a positive value of this term suggests that size elasticity, 
and therefore the minimum efficient scale, increases with time, so authorities can take 
advantage of greater economies of scale. Finally, the fourth component shows the effect of 
technological change on the quasi-fixed factor. 
4. DATA DESCRIPTION  
The sample consists of 27 Spanish port authorities which manage 46 ports. For these ports, 
annual data from 1986 until 2007 are available, being the complete panel data set of 594 
observations3.  
The data were gathered from the annual reports of Puertos del Estado (several years). This 
information has been used in other studies such as Coto-Millán et al. (2000), Baños-Pino et al. 
(1999), González and Trujillo (2008), Martínez-Budría et al. (1999), Núñez-Sánchez et al. 
(2011), etc. 
Port activity is multiproduct and for this reason we have taken into account five outputs: 
Liquid bulk (y1), Solid bulk (y2), Containerised general cargo (y3), Non-containerised general 
cargo (y4) and Passengers (y5). We also include three variable inputs: Labour (x1), Variable 
capital (x2) and Intermediate consumption (x4). Finally, a quasi-fixed input is defined in the 
specification of the distance function: Deposit surface (S), input cost shares and the cyclical 
components of traffics. Table 1 shows the variables, their construction and their descriptive 
statistics. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
5. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
                                                            
3 It is necessary to point out that the authorities of Almería and Motril are separated since 2005. However, in 
order to simplify the analysis, we have considered both authorities as a unit during the entire sample period. 
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In order to avoid endogeneity problems for the inputs, the system of equations (5)-(6) has 
been estimated using instrumental variables (Iterated Three-Stage Least Squares), which is 
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation. Since the analysis focuses only on the 
provision of port infrastructure, outputs are not considered endogenous as agents that have 
some power over where o when cargo will be moved are port terminals, so we consider that 
port authorities just have control over the inputs that they contract. The instruments used are 
the input variables lagged one period. This analysis focuses only on the provision of port 
infrastructure, therefore outputs are not considered endogenous since port authorities do not 
have control over them. We assume that this control belongs to the port terminals and 
shipping companies who decide where the freight will be moved. 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation using three different models. First, the system of 
equations has been estimated using pooled data (model 1). This specification does not 
distinguish among the port authorities which form the data panel, so it cannot collect the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In this way, not taking into account this heterogeneity 
may lead to biased estimations. The second specification for estimation corresponds to a fixed 
effect estimation where unobserved heterogeneity is collected by the inclusion of a set of 
dummies which represent the effect of time-invariant individual characteristics of each port 
authority. This model is the most appropriate when unobserved heterogeneity is correlated 
with the regressors used in the specification if this correlation does not exist, a random effects 
model would provide more efficient estimations than the fixed effects one. In this way, model 
3 presents the specification of a random effects estimator. Therefore, if there is no correlation 
among unobserved heterogeneity and regressors, both models (model 2 and 3) give us 
consistent estimations, but model 3 would be the most efficient. If that correlation occurs, 
model 3 would be inconsistent and therefore model 2 is the right one. 
In order to analyse the validity of model 1, test it is tested against model 2 using a Wald test. 
If the test rejects the null hypothesis, model 2 is more appropriate than model 1, if we cannot 
reject the hypothesis, model 1 would be chosen. The result obtained provides empirical 
evidence for rejecting the pooled model. Once model 1 has been rejected, the choice between 
model 2 and model 3 has been carried out by a Hausman test: if this contrast leads us not to 
reject the null hypothesis, it means that the difference between both estimators is very small, 
so we should choose the most efficient one, i.e., the random effects estimator, if instead the 
test reject the null hypothesis, the fixed effect model should be chosen. The Hausman test 
result leads us to reject the null hypothesis and therefore the model that best fits the 
characteristics of the sample is the fixed effects model. In this way we find evidence that 
unobserved heterogeneity of the port authority is correlated with the regressors included in the 
specification. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
From the estimation of model 2 we can see that, at the sample mean, the regularity conditions 
are satisfied: it is non-decreasing and quasi-concave in variable inputs, decreasing in outputs 
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and homogeneous of degree one in variable inputs. Moreover, we have tested whether the 
technology underlying the estimated distance function is homothetic and Wald test statistics 
lead us to reject this hypothesis. Therefore, we can conclude that the proportions of inputs 
used for port authorities depend on the level of output. 
Table 2 shows that every first-order coefficient is statistically significant and has the expected 
sign. The parameters of variable inputs are positive and, thus, indicate that distance from the 
limit increases when the use of input grows. On the other hand, output parameters are 
negative, evidencing that if outputs increase, the distance will be reduced. The sum of the 
first-order output parameters is less than one in absolute value, indicating the presence of 
increasing returns to scale. Moreover, we can conclude that labour presents a higher elasticity 
than the rest of variable inputs and that elasticity of non-containerised general cargo is the 
highest in relation with the other elasticities related to outputs.  
We also find evidence of the existence of technological progress since the coefficient 
associated to the trend is positive and significant. The results also show that this technical 
progress is labour-saving while increasing the use of capital and intermediate consumption. 
Furthermore, if we take into account the scale effect on technological change, we can see that 
the coefficients of the trend iterations with only two products are statistically different from 
zero. These are non-containerised general cargo and passengers. In the first case, the 
parameter is positive which means that there has been technical progress. Such progress in the 
case of port authorities could translate into savings of space. Therefore port authorities could 
supply more of this commodity with a lower increase in costs due to the use of new 
economies of scale. By contrast, in the other case, the coefficient related to passengers is 
negative which means that the effects of this traffic on the production process of the 
authorities are becoming worse over time. If we add the six parameters of these iterations, the 
result is very close to zero, which means that the efficiency scale has not changed. Finally, the 
effect of technological change on the quasi-fixed input is positive which means the use of this 
input improves over this period. 
On the other hand, the deposit area coefficient is negative and statistically significant, which 
means that the marginal productivity of deposit area is negative. This result could be partially 
explained due to the fact that port authorities have more deposit area than previously needed 
(Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. 2007). 
The coefficients of the cyclical components are all non-significant except the cyclical 
component of containerised general cargo4. This is a logical result, given that this type of 
traffic has become the most important traffic in recent decades and maybe the most desirable 
for port authorities, showing a dramatic growth because it is the most efficient and cheapest 
traffic, being also highly competitive. A negative sign in its coefficient means that the 
variability has a negative effect on the productivity of port authorities. From the duality 
                                                            
4 This result may be due to the structure of the data. If instead of having annual data, monthly or even quarterly 
data were available, demand variability would be clearer, since shipping traffic has a highly seasonal component. 
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between distance function and cost function we can obtain the marginal cost of containerised 
general cargo traffic variability. 
                                                                      r = 1,…,m                                            (13) 
where C is the total cost. Given that only the effect of the cyclical component of containerised 
general cargo is nonzero at the usual confidence levels, its marginal cost is the most 
important. Therefore, from equation (13) we can conclude that, at the mean, a percentage 
increase of 1% in this cyclical component causes, ceteris paribus, an increase of 0.051% in 
variable costs.  
As mentioned above, the inclusion of the cyclical components of the traffics seems not to 
have an effect on the production process of the port authorities, with the exception of 
containerised general cargo, so we may infer that demand variability is not the major cause of 
excess of capacity. Probably, others factors such as competition with the nearest ports, the 
Averch-Johnson effect linked to the rate of return regulation, or vertical relationships with 
other ports operators may have a greater weight than the uncertainty when port authorities 
make investment decisions on capacity. 
From the estimation of the system of equations it is also possible to obtain the allocative 
efficiency indices mentioned in Section 4. Allocative efficiency indices estimated by error 
components approach are shown in Table 3. These parameters represent the existing 
systematic allocative inefficiency over the sample period for each input and port authority. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
The authorities from Bahía de Algeciras, Bilbao, Ferrol-S.Cibrao, Huelva, Vigo and 
Vilagarcía are allocative efficient in the use of variable capital and labour, whereas Avilés, 
Sevilla and Málaga only use the variable capital in the correct way. The remaining authorities 
use these inputs in an inefficient way, they over-utilise these inputs when the indices are 
greater than zero and vice versa. The intermediate consumptions are inefficiently allocated by 
all authorities except Castellón, Huelva and Santander5.  
Table 3 shows that those authorities located on islands follow a common pattern. At the mean, 
they tend to under-utilise the labour and over-use the variable capital, while in the case of 
Ceuta and Melilla both over-use the labour input and under-use the variable capital. 
Annex I shows the rankings of the systematic allocative efficiency for each input. 
As already mentioned, these indices allow us to measure the systematic or time invariant 
allocative inefficiency in which port authorities incur during the development of their 
productive activity, while the parametric approach allows us to obtain relative indices of 
                                                            
5 This result may be due to the construction of the variable which encompasses all supplies, external services… 
forming a heterogeneous group. 
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allocative efficiency (kij) for observation. Table 4 shows the average indices for each port 
authority. It is important to remember that a kij coefficient greater than one indicates that the 
factor i is being underutilised with respect to factor j and vice versa, and therefore t-statistics 
in Table 4 test if the parameter kij is equal or different to one by a test of means. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
From Table 4 we can see that port authorities from Cadiz, Castellón, A Coruña, Las Palmas, 
Baleares, Pontevedra, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Santander and Tarragona underuse labour with 
respect to variable capital. On the opposite side, Alicante, Almeria, Barcelona, Cartagena, 
Ceuta, Gijón, Málaga and Pasajes overuse labour with respect to variable capital. The 
remaining port authorities are efficient in their use of these inputs. When we introduce the 
intermediate consumption in the estimation of these indices the number of efficient port 
authorities is reduced. In the case of the relation between labour and intermediate 
consumption, just Avilés and Huelva are efficient while Bahía de Algeciras, Cadiz, 
Barcelona, Bilbao, Castellón, Las Palmas, Baleares, Pasajes, Pontevedra, Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife, Santander, Sevilla, Tarragona, Valencia and Vigo underused labour with respect to 
intermediate consumption, the remaining authorities behaved in the opposite manner. Finally, 
in terms of proportion in the use of variable capital relative to intermediate consumption, the 
authorities from Castellón, Huelva, Pontevedra and Santander are efficient in an allocative 
way, while Bahía de Algeciras, Aviles, Cadiz, Barcelona, Bilbao, Las Palmas, Baleares, 
Pasajes, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Sevilla, Tarragona, Valencia and Vigo, on average, underuse 
the capital with respect to intermediate consumption, otherwise occurring in the other 
authorities. 
Table 5 reports the average values of the efficiency indices (systematic and relative) for 
different percentiles of the deposit area variable. It shows that the levels of systematic 
allocative efficiency for intermediate consumption improve with increasing deposit area. In 
the case of labour and capital, the systematic indices indicate an efficient behaviour regardless 
of the area in all percentiles except the 50th one, so we can conclude that there is not a relevant 
relation between these indices and the deposit area. In the case of the indices obtained from 
the parametric approach, the index which links labour and capital does not show a clear 
relation between kx1x2 and deposit area while the indices which relate intermediate 
consumption with the other variable inputs improve with the area size until the 90th, in which 
they become worse. Thus we can conclude that the inefficiency levels increase when the 
largest authorities are included in the percentile, although without reaching the levels of the 
first percentiles. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
The results show that the proportions in which the variable inputs are used are not optimal in 
most cases, and therefore costs would be reduced by improving the levels of allocative 
efficiency. For that to occur, it is important to determine whether variable inputs would be 
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adequate substitutes. From the estimated distance function it is possible to analyse the degree 
of substitutability among variable inputs by means of Morishima substitution elasticities . 
These elasticities inform about the variations of shadow prices given a variation in the input 
quantity. Positive values indicate complementarity between inputs while negative values 
represent substitutability. Morishima elasticities are divided into two components: on one 
hand, the cross-price elasticity shadow (Eij) which tell us if the input pairs are net substitutes 
or net complementaries, and on the other hand, the elasticity price (Eii). These elasticities are 
formally defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                (15) 
 
The results from the estimation of Morishima elasticities and their components are show in 
Tables 6 and 7. These results indicate that there is little scope for substitution between 
different pairs of inputs which, according to Rodríguez-Álvarez et al. (2004), implies that 
resolving allocative inefficiency is a difficult task. The estimated values of the shadow price 
elasticities have the expected sign for all inputs. The estimation of the cross-shadow price 
elasticities shows that labour is a net complementary input with variable capital and 
intermediate consumption, with the value of the cross-shadow price elasticity for variable 
capital and intermediate consumptions not being significant. Finally, the estimation of 
Morishima elasticities shows that labour is complementary with variable capital and 
intermediate consumption, confirming the results obtained previously. On the other hand, the 
Morishima elasticity between variable capital and intermediate consumption is not 
statistically significant. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
INSERT TABLE 7 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is an empirical application of a system of equations formed by an input distance 
function and cost share equations in order to assess the allocative inefficiency in which 
Spanish port authorities incur in the development of their economic activity. From this system 
of equations it is possible to estimate two different measures of allocative efficiency using 
two approaches: on one hand, the error components approach provides an absolute measure of 
systematic allocative inefficiency for each authority and input. On the other hand, the 
parametric approach allows obtaining relative indices of allocative inefficiency between pair 
of inputs for each observation. Our paper is the first one modelling demand variability using 
the cyclical component of the traffics in order to include estimations of uncertainty as 
explanatory variables in the distance function. The cyclical component of the traffic series has 
been extracted applying the Hodrick-Presscot filter. Moreover, from the duality between the 
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distance function and cost function, we have estimated the marginal cost associated with the 
uncertainty. 
This empirical model has been applied to a panel of data formed by 27 Spanish port 
authorities during the period 1986-2007. The sample period has been characterised by an 
important growth of maritime traffic and several regulatory changes which have led these 
authorities to be managed by a landlord model and operate according to principles such as 
financial and operating autonomy, competence, quality and efficiency, with a growing 
participation of the private sector in port activities. 
The main results of the paper are: first, we have found empirical evidence of the existence of 
increasing returns to scale and non-neutral technological progress. Second, after the inclusion 
of demand variability estimations as explanatory variables, only the cyclical component of 
containerised general cargo is significant at the usual confidence levels. This makes sense 
because this kind of traffic is the most competitive and volatile. Third, the marginal 
productivity of deposit area is negative due to the existence of an excess of capacity. From 
this and the former results, we conclude that demand variability is not the main reason for the 
excess of capacity; other factors such as regulation (Averch-Johnson effect), competition 
between nearest ports or vertical relationships among port operators may be more important 
determinants than uncertainty on the investment decisions on capacity. Our model is not 
prepared to discuss what the effect of these factors on investment decisions is, but it could be 
a good starting point for future research. Finally, it has been found that resource allocation is 
not efficient. Moreover, the estimations of Morishima elasticities show that the possibilities of 
substitution between pairs of inputs are very limited, so the allocative inefficiencies in the 
Spanish port system are difficult to solve in the short term.  
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Table 1: Variables and sample descriptive statistics (1986-2007) 
Variables Description Construction Units Mean St. dev Max Min 
x1 Labour The average annual number of employees Number of workers 228.81 128.65 823 41.00 
x2 Variable capital Annual depreciation expense Constant thousand Euros 7,756.98 6,096.72 3,1142 632.00 
x3 Intermediate consumption 
Annual consumption expense, services 
externally provided plus other expenses 
Constant thousand Euros 5,188.73 4,908.01 3.,0748 139.00 
S Deposit surface Stocking area Squared-meters 556,482.38 672,155.93 4,110,396 11,354.00 
sh1 Labour cost share Labour cost divided by total cost Share 0.41 0.09 0.65 0.20 
sh2 Capital cost share Capital cost divided by total cost Share 0.36 0.08 0.62 0.18 
sh3 
Intermediate consumption 
cost share 
Intermediate consumption  cost divided by total 
cost 
Share 0.23 0.07 0.56 0.03 
y1 Liquid bulk Annual liquid bulk traffic Ton 4,640,798.55 5,819,802.18 22,772,847 0.00 
y2 Solid bulk Annual solid bulk traffic Ton 2,997,545.15 3,182,834.34 19,658,167 6,210.00 
y3 Containerised general cargo Annual container throughput in tons Ton 2,122,073.85 5,364,087.93 42,468,177 0.00 
y4 
Non-containerised general 
cargo 
Annual non- containerised general cargo 
throughput in tons 
Ton 1,357,992.19 1,481,894.52 9,768,065 61,067.00 
y5 Passengers Annual passengers moved Thousand passengers 610,820.39 1,172,725.37 5,793,708 0.00 
Source: Puertos del Estado. 
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Table 2: Estimation of the distance function using three different estimates 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient   t-statistic Coefficient   t-statistic Coefficient   t-statistic 
Const. 0.0347  1.09 0.4462 *** 3.69 -0.0091  -1.19
L(x1) 0.4056 *** 211.03 0.4053 *** 210.62 0.4045 *** 207.84
L(x2) 0.3647 *** 286.46 0.3649 *** 282.5 0.3654 *** 284.41
L(x3) 0.2297 *** 244.42 0.2298 *** 250.27 0.2300 *** 247.03
L(y1) -0.0375 *** -4.38 -0.0484 *** -4.43 -0.0517 *** -3.97
L(y2) -0.1121 *** -6.52 -0.1442 *** -6.22 -0.1534 *** -5.63
L(y3) -0.0332 *** -5.31 -0.0186 ** -2.55 -0.0294 *** -3.4
L(y4) -0.1666 *** -7.52 -0.1067 *** -4.38 -0.0790 *** -2.86
L(y5) -0.0231 *** -3.89 -0.0168 * -1.94 -0.0117  -1.21
L(S) -0.2886 *** -12.71 -0.1415 *** -5.89 -0.1011 *** -3.78
L(T) 0.0179 *** 8.02 0.0087 *** 3.31 0.0072 ** 2.43
CC1 -0.0121 ** -1.75 -0.0025  -0.59 0.0007  0.13
CC2 -0.0133 ** -1.83 -0.0016  -0.37 -0.0054  -1.04
CC3 -0.0095 * -1.64 -0.0100 *** -2.75 -0.0103 ** -2.33
CC4 0.0041  0.46 0.0054  1.08 0.0051  0.83
CC5 -0.0161 *** -3.03 0.0037  0.76 0.0044  0.75
L(x1)L(x1) 0.0632 *** 10.63 0.0864 *** 17.09 0.0951 *** 21.43
L(x2)L(x2) 0.1608 *** 48.51 0.1667 *** 56.14 0.1720 *** 66.13
L(x3)L(x3) 0.1258 *** 57.2 0.1312 *** 64.65 0.1390 *** 82.95
L(y1)L(y1) 0.0073 *** 2.92 0.0037  1.47 0.0040  1.31
L(y2)L(y2) 0.1006 *** 5.05 0.0460 *** 3.11 0.0166  0.93
L(y3)L(y3) -0.0075 *** -4.87 -0.0026 ** -2.05 -0.0045 *** -2.9
L(y4)L(y4) -0.0741 ** -2.09 -0.0302  -1.19 -0.0484  -1.57
L(y5)L(y5) 0.0019  0.38 -0.0156 *** -3.25 -0.0157 *** -2.74
L(S)L(S) 0.1504 *** 3.89 0.1010 *** 3.86 0.0600 * 1.89
L(x1)L(x2) -0.0491 *** -12.51 -0.0610 *** -18.03 -0.0640 *** -21.44
L(x1)L(x3) -0.0141 *** -4.8 -0.0255 *** -9.85 -0.0311 *** -14
L(x2)L(x3) -0.1117 *** -53.06 -0.1057 *** -55.26 -0.1080 *** -67.22
L(x1)L(y1) -0.0029 *** -3.4 -0.0018 ** -2.21 -0.0015 ** -2.16
L(x1)L(y2) -0.0116 *** -5.45 -0.0110 *** -5.21 -0.0120 *** -6.86
L(x1)L(y3) -0.0020 *** -4.03 -0.0016 *** -3.33 -0.0017 *** -4.24
L(x1)L(y4) 0.0522 ** 1.94 0.1015 *** 6.38 -0.0007  -0.31
L(x1)L(y5) 0.0248 ** 2.23 0.0095  1.39 -0.0006  -0.93
L(x2)L(y1) 0.0013 ** 2.29 0.0008  1.37 0.0007  1.38
L(x2)L(y2) 0.0074 *** 5.23 0.0071 *** 5.01 0.0078 *** 6.53
L(x2)L(y3) 0.0013 *** 4.03 0.0011 *** 3.37 0.0012 *** 4.29
L(x2)L(y4) 0.0009  0.48 -0.0003  -0.15 0.0002  0.12
L(x2)L(y5) 0.0036  0.35 -0.0150 ** -2.18 0.0005  1.03
L(x3)L(y1) 0.0016 *** 3.84 0.0011 *** 2.69 0.0009 ** 2.41
L(x3)L(y2) 0.0042 *** 4.04 0.0039 *** 3.85 0.0043 *** 4.65
L(x3)L(y3) 0.0007 *** 2.79 0.0005 ** 2.21 0.0005 *** 2.58
L(x3)L(y4) -0.0531 ** -1.98 -0.1012 *** -6.4 0.0005  0.43
L(x3)L(y5) 0.0126 * 1.39 0.0193 *** 3.39 0.0002  0.44
L(y1)L(y2) -0.0255 *** -3.72 -0.0211 *** -3.21 -0.0240 *** -2.99
L(y1)L(y3) 0.0057 *** 5.31 0.0000  -0.02 -0.0004  -0.37
L(y1)L(y4) 0.0407 *** 3.93 0.0149 ** 2.05 0.0173 ** 1.98
L(y1)L(y5) -0.0242 *** -8.52 -0.0207 *** -6.97 -0.0207 *** -5.7
L(y2)L(y3) 0.0004  0.1 0.0066 * 1.66 0.0066  1.35
L(y2)L(y4) 0.0590 ** 2.41 0.0410 ** 2.46 0.0356 * 1.74
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient   t-statistic Coefficient   t-statistic Coefficient   t-statistic 
L(y2)L(y5) 0.0295 *** 5.33 0.0210 *** 3.81 0.0227 *** 3.52
L(y3)L(y4) 0.0118 *** 2.88 0.0071 ** 2.47 0.0076 ** 2.16
L(y3)L(y5) 0.0026 ** 2.02 0.0041 *** 4.24 0.0040 *** 3.33
L(y4)L(y5) 0.0083  0.89 -0.0178 ** -2.48 -0.0146 * -1.66
L(x1)L(S) -0.0039  -1.22 -0.0021  -0.66 0.0009  0.35
L(x2)L(S) 0.0001  0.04 -0.0008  -0.4 -0.0025  -1.38
L(x3)L(S) 0.0038 ** 2.43 0.0029 ** 1.94 0.0016  1.13
L(y1)L(S) 0.0101  0.85 -0.0073  -0.87 -0.0045  -0.44
L(y2)L(S) -0.1556 *** -6.8 -0.0890 *** -5.35 -0.0664 *** -3.27
L(y3)L(S) -0.0041  -0.6 0.0025  0.52 0.0063  1.08
L(y4)L(S) -0.0538  -1.46 -0.0235  -0.87 -0.0246  -0.74
L(y5)L(S) -0.0124  -1.08 -0.0200  -2.44 -0.0167 * -1.74
L(T)L(T) 0.0003  0.54 -0.0005 * -1.34 0.0003  0.74
L(x1)L(T) -0.0029 *** -7.1 -0.0020 *** -5.14 -0.0016 *** -4.37
L(x2)L(T) 0.0010 *** 3.65 0.0005 ** 2 0.0004  1.6
L(x3)L(T) 0.0019 *** 9.52 0.0015 *** 7.79 0.0012 *** 6.78
L(y1)L(T) 0.0007  0.65 -0.0005  -0.59 -0.0001  -0.15
L(y2)L(T) -0.0009  -0.42 -0.0003  -0.17 -0.0003  -0.17
L(y3)L(T) 0.0014 ** 2.44 -0.0004  -1.11 -0.0003  -0.73
L(y4)L(T) -0.0044  -1.34 0.0092 *** 4.07 0.0077 *** 2.97
L(y5)L(T) -0.0063 *** -7.19 -0.0041 *** -6.42 -0.0051 *** -7.04
L(S)L(T) 0.0095 *** 3.09 0.0072 *** 3.41 0.0044  1.72
 
Port authority dummies 
included 
Port authority dummies 
included 
Port authority dummies 
included 
  
Equation R-sq RMSE R-sq RMSE R-sq RMSE
Distance 
function --- 0.2458 --- 0.2033 --- 0.1812
Labour share 
equation 0.6821 0.0456 0.6887 0.0477 0.6730 0.0463
Capital share 
equation 0.8517 0.0302 0.8315 0.0323 0.8486 0.0305
Intermediate 
consumption  0.8937 0.0222 0.8972 0.0233 0.8948 0.0221
share equation             
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 3: Average values of systematic allocative inefficiencies for each authority  
Authority ax1   t-statistic   ax2   t-statistic   ax3   t-statistic 
Bahía de 
Algeciras -0.004  -0.795  0.000  -0.088  0.037 *** 4.162 
Alicante 0.037 *** 4.132  -0.021 *** -4.952  -0.135 *** -14.187 
Almería-Motril 0.029 *** 3.654  -0.016 *** -3.234  -0.122 *** -16.235 
Avilés 0.013 * 1.628  -0.004  -0.858  0.108 *** 14.644 
Bahía de Cádiz -0.012 * -1.578  0.012 * 1.676  0.029 ** 2.100 
Barcelona 0.040 *** 5.721  -0.030 *** -10.893  0.069 *** 8.336 
Bilbao 0.004  0.953  -0.002  -0.444  0.136 *** 15.695 
Cartagena 0.039 *** 4.750  -0.020 *** -3.346  -0.097 *** -6.896 
Castellón -0.020 ** -1.869  0.011 * 1.522  0.003  0.532 
Ceuta 0.037 *** 4.335  -0.030 *** -4.224  -0.100 *** -16.613 
Ferrol-S. Cibrao -0.012  -0.851  0.002  0.189  -0.024 ** -1.805 
Gijón 0.032 *** 3.072  -0.019 *** -2.819  -0.030 *** -3.353 
Huelva -0.006  -0.870  0.002  0.375  -0.020  -0.973 
A Coruña -0.027 *** -3.551  0.020 *** 3.733  -0.077 *** -5.792 
Las Palmas -0.021 *** -3.609  0.018 *** 4.316  0.056 *** 8.579 
Málaga 0.007 * 1.592  -0.003  -1.180  -0.100 *** -15.599 
Melilla 0.015 * 1.512  -0.013 ** -1.812  -0.112 *** -27.927 
Baleares -0.011 * -1.365  0.010 * 1.468  0.074 *** 7.382 
Pasajes 0.053 *** 9.986  -0.027 *** -7.818  0.122 *** 23.470 
Marín y Ría 
Pontevedra -0.038 *** -2.706  0.024 ** 2.496  0.013 * 1.572 
Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife -0.039 *** -4.639  0.024 *** 3.793  0.038 *** 4.206 
Santander -0.023 *** -3.198  0.008 ** 1.903  0.002  0.216 
Sevilla -0.009 * -1.419  -0.001  -0.289  0.025 ** 2.152 
Tarragona -0.019 *** -2.182  0.010 * 1.689  0.021 ** 2.022 
Valencia 0.012 * 1.586  -0.010 ** -2.323  0.114 *** 8.789 
Vigo 0.005  0.554  -0.003  -0.471  0.071 *** 8.831 
Vilagarcía 0.010   0.687   -0.009   -0.858   -0.124 *** -9.935 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Average values of relative indices kij of allocative efficiency for each authority 
Authority kx1x2   t-statistic   kx1x3   t-statistic   kx2x3   t-statistic 
Bahía de 
Algeciras 1.0155  0.5961  1.1858 *** 4.1000  1.1673 *** 4.2686
Alicante 0.8645 *** -4.7331  0.5878 *** -13.3115  0.6844 *** -10.2970
Almería-Motril 0.9013 *** -3.3408  0.6094 *** -16.4609  0.6759 *** -20.3221
Avilés 0.9653  -1.0304  1.8385  1.0229  2.1109 * 1.4652
Bahía de Cádiz 1.0738 ** 2.0331  1.3808 ** 2.2703  1.2296 ** 1.8680
Barcelona 0.8254 *** -7.8454  1.2128 *** 4.6208  1.4833 *** 7.5778
Bilbao 0.9839  -0.6991  2.0543 *** 10.1813  2.1127 *** 9.2925
Cartagena 0.8738 *** -4.5238  0.6119 *** -9.8561  0.7217 *** -4.9150
Castellón 1.0944 ** 1.7975  1.0789 * 1.3822  0.9928  -0.2268
Ceuta 0.8553 *** -4.7237  0.6191 *** -12.7069  0.7214 *** -14.4499
Ferrol-S. Cibrao 1.0678  0.9332  0.8776 * -1.4146  0.8150 *** -2.6372
Gijón 0.9008 *** -2.6431  0.8552 *** -2.8929  0.9471 * -1.5225
Huelva 1.0363  1.2715  1.0591  0.6765  1.0089  0.1279
A Coruña 1.1438 *** 3.8846  0.8201 *** -4.5066  0.7336 *** -6.0170
Las Palmas 1.1177 *** 4.6385  1.4338 *** 7.3401  1.2763 *** 7.1383
Málaga 0.9777 * -1.3395  0.6552 *** -14.1089  0.6683 *** -17.9615
Melilla 0.9561  -0.9641  0.6142 *** -14.3607  0.6462 *** -20.7660
Baleares 1.0707 * 1.6783  1.6211 *** 6.7234  1.5097 *** 8.0580
Pasajes 0.8167 *** -10.6740  2.1154 *** 9.1622  2.6066 *** 10.2048
Marín y Ría de 
Pontevedra 1.2009 *** 2.5624  1.2523 *** 3.3619  1.0621  1.3084
Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife 1.2267 *** 5.0367  1.3825 *** 5.1961  1.1129 *** 3.6652
Santander 1.1027 *** 3.3541  1.0861 * 1.3766  0.9759  -0.7382
Sevilla 1.0296  1.0107  1.1373 ** 2.3489  1.1057 ** 2.1416
Tarragona 1.1089 *** 2.5993  1.1786 *** 3.8013  1.0825 ** 1.8362
Valencia 0.9624  -1.2705  1.7592 *** 6.3252  1.7877 *** 10.4033
Vigo 0.9982  -0.0519  1.4866 *** 4.9614  1.4895 *** 6.2692
Vilagarcía 0.9932  -0.1109  0.4431 *** -4.4029  0.4106 *** -3.5264
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Table 5:  Average values of coefficients kij per percentile of deposit area 
Percentile ax1   ax2   ax3         kx1x2        kx1x3         kx2x3   
10th 0.0042  -0.0047  -0.0867 *** 1.0097 *** 0.7300 *** 0.7134 ***
25th 0.0021  -0.0041  -0.0660 *** 1.0124 *** 0.8028 *** 0.7783 ***
50th 0.0050 * -0.0043 * -0.0452 *** 0.9995 *** 0.9362 *** 0.9481 ***
75th 0.0026   -0.0018   -0.0218 *** 1.0129 *** 1.0538 *** 1.0560 ***
90th 0.0023   -0.0018   -0.0109 *** 1.0118 *** 1.1031 *** 1.1042 ***
* p<0,1, ** p<0,05, *** p<0,01 
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Table 6: Morishima elasticities: Mij 
  Mean   t-statistic     Mean   t-statistic 
Mx1x2 0.6072 ** 409.0562  Mx2x1 0.3717 ** 108.6386 
Mx1x3 0.6506 ** 93.9213  Mx3x1 0.5402 ** 138.7233 
Mx2x3 -0.0124 ** -0.4458  Mx3x2 0.0310 ** 0.9035 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
               Evaluated at the means of the data using the parameters estimates of 5-6 
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Table 7: Cross-shadow price elasticities and own-shadow price elasticities: eij y eii 
  Mean   t-statistic     Mean   t-statistic 
ex1x2 0.2321 ** 97.0037  ex2x1 0.2100 ** 87.4883 
ex1x3 0.2755 ** 37.3897  ex3x1 0.1651 ** 42.8295 
ex2x3 -0.1741  -6.2836  ex3x2 -0.0704 ** -19.3470 
ex1x1 -0.3751 ** -283.1105  ex2x2 -0.1617 ** -112.6867 
ex3x3 -0.1014   -3.0284           
            * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
             Evaluated at the means of the data using the parameters estimates of 5-6 
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ANNEX 1: Rankings of the systematic indexes of allocative efficiency 
 
  LABOUR VARIABLE CAPITAL INTERMEDIATE CONSUMPTION 
  
Port 
authority 
Systematic 
allocative 
index 
Port 
authority 
Systematic 
allocative 
index 
Port 
authority 
Systematic 
allocative 
index 
Most 
efficient Bilbao 0.0043
Bahía de 
Algeciras -0.0004 Santander 0.0021
Bahía de Algeciras -0.0044 Sevilla -0.0014 Castellón 0.0035
 
Vigo 0.0051 Huelva 0.0019
Marín y Ría de 
Pontevedra 0.0128
 Huelva -0.0062 Bilbao -0.002 Huelva -0.0201
 
Málaga 0.0069
Ferrol-S. 
Cibrao 0.0022 Tarragona 0.0207
 Sevilla -0.009 Vigo -0.0025 Ferrol-S. Cibrao -0.0238
 Vilagarcía 0.0096 Málaga -0.0033 Sevilla 0.0249
 Baleares -0.0113 Avilés -0.0041 Bahía de Cádiz 0.0291
 Valencia 0.0119 Santander 0.0078 Gijón -0.0303
 
Ferrol-S. Cibrao -0.0123 Vilagarcía -0.0092
Bahía de 
Algeciras 0.037
 
Bahía de Cádiz -0.0125 Valencia -0.0097
Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife 0.0382
 Avilés 0.013 Baleares 0.01 Las Palmas 0.0559
 Melilla 0.0148 Tarragona 0.0104 Barcelona 0.0689
 Tarragona -0.0192 Castellón 0.0106 Vigo 0.0709
 Castellón -0.0196 Bahía de Cádiz 0.0117 Baleares 0.0735
 Las Palmas -0.0213 Melilla -0.0125 A Coruña -0.0767
 Santander -0.0228 Almería-Motril -0.016 Cartagena -0.097
 A Coruña -0.0272 Las Palmas 0.018 Ceuta -0.0998
 Almería-Motril 0.0286 Gijón -0.0188 Málaga -0.1001
 Gijón 0.0323 Cartagena -0.0197 Avilés 0.1084
 Alicante 0.0369 A Coruña 0.0199 Melilla -0.1124
 Ceuta 0.0373 Alicante -0.0209 Valencia 0.1143
 Marín y Ría de 
Pontevedra -0.0376
Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife 0.0236 Almería-Motril -0.1218
 
Cartagena 0.0387
Marín y  Ría de 
Pontevedra 0.0241 Pasajes 0.1225
 Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife -0.0389 Pasajes -0.0272 Vilagarcía -0.1236
Least  
efficient 
Barcelona 0.0396 Ceuta -0.0295 Alicante -0.1352
Pasajes 0.0531 Barcelona -0.03 Bilbao 0.1355
 
 
 
